LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
RULES
OF INTERPRETATION
A Rule is a uniform or established course of things. It is that which is prescribed or laid down as a guide for conduct or action; a governing direction for a specific purpose; an authoritative enactment; a regulation; a prescription; a precept; as, the rules of various societies; the rules governing a school; a rule of etiquette or propriety etc. It should be remembered that these Rules are Rules of Practice and not Rules of Law. Without these rules, it would soon become impossible to not only understand the law but even just to apply it, as new situations are always coming to light which Parliament and the courts could not have foreseen when the law was developed. Do judges really use the rules of statutory interpretation? If yes, which rule do they use first? – Judges rarely if ever, volunteer the information that they are now applying a certain rule of interpretation. Often, judges look to see if there can be a literal meaning to the words used in the disputed statutory provision. However there is no rule that states that they must use the literal rule first. No Legal Rules exist which state which rule of Interpretation can be used and the rules of interpretation that have been identified, are not themselves legal rules.
LITERAL
When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural ordinary and popular sense, it is meant that words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the Statute. In the statement of the rule, the epithets ‘natural, “ordinary”, “literal”, “grammatical” and “popular” are employed almost interchangeably to convey the same idea.
Rationale for this Rule
· Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from taking sides in legislative or political issues.
· It can help to provide for consistency in interpretation.
INGREDIENTS
2) Necessity for interpretation does not arise where language is plain.
3) If language is plain consequences to be disregarded.
4) Ordinary and natural meaning not to be controlled by supposed intention.
5) Courts not to make an assumption of intention before construction.
6) Words to be given their natural meaning, even if not in consonance with legislative intent.
8) Ordinary and natural meaning not to be controlled by considerations of public policy.
Pritipal Singh V. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 1413, P. 1419(1982)), it was held that there is a presumption that the words are used in an Act of Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.
Sussex Peerage Case
This rule stated that: "The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case; best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the Legislature, it has always been held a safe mean of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which, according to Chief Justice Dyer is "a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intend to redress".
Flisher MR in R. v. The Judge of the City of London Court1where he stated that "if the words of an Act are clear you must follow them, even though they lead to manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the Legislature has committed an absurdity."1 '' This means that only the words of the statute count; if they are clear by themselves then effect must be given to them. This rule also has its drawbacks; it disregards consequences and the object of the statute may be considered only if there is doubt.
In the case Prakash v. State of Haryana [(2004) 1 SCC 339J of
plain reading of S. 361 of Indian Penal Code 1860 the minor's consent was found
to be wholly immaterial. Neither did the section require that the taking of the
minor should be by force or fraud. The plain text of the section only accords
significance to the consent of the guardian.
Vishwabharti House Building Co-operative Society . The Supreme Court was required to consider the meaning of S.25 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. The section provided that the orders made by District Forum/State commission or National Commission will be deemed to be a decree or order made by civil court in a suit. The purpose of the legal fiction was to enable execution of orders passed by the forum or commission. It was only in the event of its inability to execute its orders that the commission or forum should approach the civil court for execution of its orders. To hold that all orders of the commission or forum had to be executed by the civil court would violate the plain meaning of the section
In Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand was changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be moved within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to section 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read as “30 days from the knowledge of the order”. The 1 3 Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the application as invalid. Lord
A truck belonging to the respondent was used to carry contraband opium, but without the respondent's ledge. Under Sec.11 of the Opium Act, 1878, as modified by the opium (Madhya Bharat Amendment) 1955 the truck was ordered to be confiscated as the words used in the amended section are 'shall e confiscated, whereas, the words used in the main Act are 'shall be liable to be confiscated'. On appeal to the High Court held that the section conferred a discretion on the Magistrate and that in the particular circumstances of the case the truck should not have been confiscated. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held : “The the High Court was right in reading the section as permissive and not obligatory. It is well settled that the use of the word 'shall' does not always mean that the enactment is obligatory or mandatory. It depends upon the context in which the word 'shall' occurs and other circumstances. In the present case could be unjust to confiscate the truck as the respondent had no knowledge of the commission of the offence. It is well recognized that if a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not indented, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, or even that structure of the sentence
Lord
Diplock observed in Duport Steel Ltd v Sirs that:
Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not
then for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to
give effect to its plain meaning because they consider the consequences for
doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.
No judge can deviate from the meaning of the statute though decision maybe
unjust. The words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning[7].
The literal rule accepts supremacy of the Parliament: the right to make laws,
even though sometimes, they seem absurd. In the literal rule of interpretation,
there is no contrary meaning within the statute.
Where there is no ambiguity in words, the question of intention ought not to be
admitte
Atkinson stated, ‘In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.
To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include "definitions" sections within a statute, which explicitly define the most important terms used in that statute. But some statutes omit a definitions section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to define a particular term. The plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself. According to Viscount Haldane, L.C., if the language used has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so. According to the plain meaning rule, absent a contrary definition within the statute, words must be given their plain, ordinary and literal meaning. If the words are clear, they must be applied, even though the intention of the legislator may have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of what the law means.
MAQBOOL HUSSAIN V STATE OF BOMBAY
The Appellant arrived on the airport and did not declare
he brought gold with him, found in his possession during checking and it was
in violation of govt notification. Gold was confiscated under section 167(8) sea
custom act and charged under sec 8 fera
he pleaded his the trial was violative of Article 20(2) i.e double jeopardy as he was already
punished by confiscation of gold. Sc
held that sea custom act is not a court or judicial authority, hence
confiscation was not a prosecution trial was legal.
SA VENKATARAMAN V UNION OF INDIA
The inquiry has been filed against the appellant under the public service inquiry act and the appellant was given the opportunity under article 311 to show cause. Later he was charged under sec5(2) of the prevention of corruption act and sec 161 and 165 of ipc. Court held that inquiry before the commissioner was not prosecution. Hence trial valid
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